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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-2398 
 ___________ 
 
 RICHARD CARRINGTON, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A042-303-040 ) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Andrew R. Arthur 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 23, 2011 
 Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  April 5, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Richard Carrington petitions for review of a decision of the Board of  
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which dismissed his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s 
(“IJ”) final removal order.  For the reasons below, we will deny the petition for review. 
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I. 
Carrington is a native and citizen of Barbados.  He was admitted to the United 
States as a Legal Permanent Resident in August 1991.  In 1997, he pled guilty to and was 
convicted of forgery in Pennsylvania state court.  He was sentenced to twenty-three 
months of imprisonment, with immediate parole given at the time of sentencing.  In 
August 2009, the Department of Homeland Security served Carrington with a Notice to 
Appear (“NTA”), charging him with removability for having committed an aggravated 
felony, see INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)], and for having been 
convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, see INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii)  
[8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)]. 
On November 16, 2009, after being afforded two continuances to obtain an 
attorney or representative of his choosing, the IJ proceeded with Carrington’s hearing and 
he admitted the allegations in the NTA.  The IJ found Carrington removable as charged 
under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), as defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(R) [8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(R)], based on his forgery conviction.  However, the IJ found that Carrington 
was not removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii).  Accordingly, the IJ concluded that 
Carrington was not eligible for discretionary relief from removal and ordered him 
removed to Barbados. 
Carrington timely appealed the decision to the BIA and, on April 12, 2010, the 
BIA dismissed the appeal, noting that Carrington had not filed any relief applications.  
The BIA concluded that the IJ was correct in finding that Carrington’s record of 
conviction for forgery, for which the term of imprisonment was at least one year, 
2 
 
constituted an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(R).  Carrington has petitioned 
for review of the BIA’s decision.  
II. 
We have jurisdiction over Carrington’s petition for review under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(D).1  Although 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(C) limits our jurisdiction over final 
decisions ordering removal based on the commission of an aggravated felony, we retain 
jurisdiction over constitutional claims and questions of law.  See Leslie v. Att’y Gen., 
611 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(D) and Papageorgiou v. 
Gonzales, 413 F.3d 356, 358 (3d. Cir. 2005)).  The question whether a particular 
conviction constitutes an aggravated felony is a legal question that we review de novo.  
Jeune v. Att’y Gen., 476 F.3d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 2007). 
Despite Carrington’s arguments to the contrary, the BIA properly concluded that 
he was convicted of an aggravated felony.  The statutory definition of aggravated felony 
includes “an offense relating to . . . forgery . . . for which the term of imprisonment is at 
least one year.”  INA § 101(a)(43)(R).  In Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 250-51 (3d 
Cir. 2001), we concluded that a violation of the Delaware forgery statute, which 
encompassed more conduct than the traditional definition of forgery by including an 
intent to deceive or injure, in addition to an intent to defraud, constituted an aggravated 
felony.  We further concluded that Congress intended to define forgery in its broadest 
sense by stating that an offense “relating to” forgery qualifies as an aggravated felony.  
                                                 
1 We reject the Government’s argument that the petition for review was untimely 
filed. 
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Id. At 249.  Like Delaware’s statute, Pennsylvania’s forgery statute also includes the 
intent to defraud or injure.  See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4101(a).   
Carrington also argues that his conviction is not an aggravated felony as defined 
under the INA because he was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least one 
year, as is required under § 101(a)(43)(R).  Specifically, he claims that although he was 
sentenced to a maximum term of twenty-three months of imprisonment, he was 
immediately paroled at the time of his sentencing.  However, the BIA properly held that § 
101(a)(43)(R) refers to the sentence imposed, not the time actually served, in determining 
whether a criminal conviction is an aggravated felony under the INA.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Maldonado-Ramirez, 216 F.3d 940, 943-44 (11th Cir. 2000). 
  The BIA also properly held that, for immigration purposes, the type of 
indeterminate sentence that Carrington received is treated as functionally equivalent to a 
sentence with only a maximum term.  “Under Pennsylvania law, the minimum term 
imposed on a prison sentence merely sets the date prior to which a prisoner may not be 
paroled.”  Rogers v. Pa. Bd. Of Probation & Parole, 724 A.2d 319, 321 n.2 (Pa. 1999).  
The maximum range, therefore, controls whether the term of imprisonment is at least one 
year.  See Bovkun v. Ashcroft, 283 F.3d 166, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2002).  Under Bovkun, 
Carrington’s maximum term of twenty-three months is sufficient to qualify as an 
aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(R).2  Thus, we conclude that Carrington was 
                                                 
2 We also reject Carrington’s contention that because the loss to the victim in his 
case totals less than $10,000, his forgery offense does not qualify as an aggravated 
felony.  Although his argument is not well developed, he appears to assert that his 
conviction is also encompassed by INA § 101(a)(43)(M).  That provision, in 
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properly found removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined 
in INA § 101(a)(43)(R). 
Lastly, Carrington argues that his due process rights were violated because the 
agency did not provide him with fair notice of the charges against him.  Specifically, he 
argues that although the NTA correctly charged him with removability for having been 
convicted of forgery pursuant to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4101(a)(1), the IJ indicated in his 
opinion that Carrington had been convicted of forgery under subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) 
of the statute.  The BIA concluded, and we agree, that Carrington was put on fair notice 
of the charges against him and that any errors were harmless and did not result in any 
prejudice to him.  Indeed, it is § 4101(a) that renders any subsection (i.e., (a)(1), (a)(2), or 
(a)(3)) of the statute an aggravated felony.3   
The NTA clearly indicates that Carrington was removable for having been 
convicted under § 4101(a).  Moreover, we agree with the BIA that Carrington has failed 
                                                                                                                                                             
relevant part, refers to an offense that “involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to 
the . . . victim [ ] exceeds $10,000 . . .”  However, the argument is foreclosed by 
our holding in Bobb v. Att’y Gen., 458 F.3d 213, 226 (3d Cir. 2006), wherein we 
determined that that forgery is not a hybrid offense because “the class ‘offense 
related to forgery’ is not entirely a subset of the class ‘offense involving fraud.’” 
 
3 Section 4101(a) provides:  A person is guilty of forgery if, with intent to defraud 
or injure anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud or injury to be 
perpetrated by anyone, the actor: (1) alters any writing of another without his 
authority; (2) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues or transfers any 
writing so that it purports to be the act of another who did not authorize that act, or 
to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was 
in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed; or 
(3) utters any writing which he knows to be forged in a manner specified in 
paragraphs (1) or (2) of this subsection.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4101(a). 
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to allege, let alone demonstrate that, even if an error were found, he suffered substantial 
prejudice.  See Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 448 (3d Cir. 2005) (requiring  a 
showing of substantial prejudice to prevail on a due process challenge).4    
 For the above reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                                 
4 We lack jurisdiction to review Carrington’s argument that he is actually innocent 
of forgery under Pennsylvania law. 
